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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
The principal issue in this case is whether Appellants 
have commenced their action against the Respondents, who are 
Health Care Providers, within two years after the Appellant 
discovered or through the use of reasonable dilligence should 
have discovered the injury to Appellant Saundra Brower and 
proximately to the Appellant Oscar Brower, as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-14-4 (1978 & Supp.1979 ). 
II. 
Whether in fact there is a right to a separate trial 
on the Statute of Limitation issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 78-12-47. 
III. 
Whether there was active concealment of the negligence 
by the Respondents tolling the two year statute under Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 78-14-4. 
IV. 
Whether Appellants with no medical expertise are charged 
with knowledge of the negligence of the Health Care provider, 
in the absence of actual knowledge of such negligence. 
V. 
Whether the two year Statute of Limitations for medical 
malpractice commenced to run in July, 1981, when the 
Appellants were advised by a member of the healing arts 
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profession that there had been negligence on the part of 
Respondents in October, 1980. 
VI. 
Whether Appellants had any subjective understanding of 
the field of medicine. 
VII. 
Whether the injury was of such a catastrophic nature 
that Appellants should have been put on notice. 
VIII. 
Whether there was a possibility the injury might have 
been mistaken as an unavoidable consequence of the medical 
treatment. 
IX. 
Whether genuine issues of fact exist, precluding the 
granting of the Respondents' motions for summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent I.H.C Hospitals, dba Valley 
View Medical Center, entered February 26, 1985, and from the 
summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dr. David W. Brown 
entered January 25, 1985, which are final judgments; and from 
the judgment denying Appellants1 motions for summary judgment 
as to both Respondents entered March 11, 1985. The notice of 
appeal was filed March 25, 1985. 
This is a medical malpractice case, alleging negligence 
on the part of the Respondent I.H.C. Hospitals dba Valley 
View Medical Center and Respondent Dr. David W. Brown, 
arrising out of a surgical hysterectomy performed on the 
Appellant Saundra Brower by Respondent Dr. David W.Brown on 
Otober 22, 1980, while hospitalized at the Valley View 
Medical Center in Cedar City, Utah. (Complaint ^ 1 -20.) 
Appellant Saundra Brower sustained a puncture wound injury to 
her upper right thigh while in the recovery room of and under 
the care and control of Respondents, and while anesthetized 
or recovering therefrom. (Complaint ^ 24-31.) Appellant 
Saundra Brower alleges that Respondent Dr. David W. Brown 
negligently performed the surgery, that he negligently 
treated her thereafter, and that as a result of the 
negligence of the said Respondents, that the Appellant 
Saundra Brower sustained the injuries alleged in her 
complaint on file. ( |^ 1-23) 
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Appellants were not informed of the wrongful conduct of 
Respondents until July, 1981, when Appellant Saundra Brower 
was required to seek emergency treatment from another 
doctor. (Complaint 2-3) 
Damages are prayed also for Appellant Oscar W. Brower, 
husband of Appellant Saundra Brower, for loss of consortium, 
and other general damages. 
The ninety day statutory notice of intent was duly given 
to Respondents February, 16, 1983, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
sec 78-14-8, and the complaint was filed June 14, 1983. 
(Complaint .8) Appellants filed their own motion, which was 
denied, asking that the court rule that no issue existed as 
to the Statute of Limitation Section, Utah Code Ann. sec 
78-12-47, (1953 as ammended) and that the Respondents be 
not entitled to a separate trial on said issue, as a matter 
of law. That motion was denied. (Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment dated Sep. 17, 1984 , Judgment Denying Plaintiff 
Motion entered Mar. 11, 1985.) 
Included in the record are the depositions of Respondent 
Dr. Brown, each of the Appellants, and Doyle T. Cantrell, 
Virginia E. Wyatt and Condra Lawrence, the latter three being 
employees of the Respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. Those 
depositions were ordered published. (See Order Publishing 
Depositions Jan. 1985.) 
Appellant Saundra Brown, sustained an injury to her 
right thigh before recovering from anesthetic in the Valley 
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View Hospital in connection with surgery therein on or about 
Oct. 22, 1980, while under the exclusive care and control of 
x
 the Respondents, Dr. Brown and I.H.C Hospitals. Also see 
Complaint of Appellants, 1-24) 
The hysterectomy performed on Appellant Saundra Brower 
did not correct her problems. Respondent Dr. Brown, a couple 
of weeks after the hysterectomy, treated and prescribed for 
said Appellant, and told her that he could do nothing more 
for her. (Deposition of Saundra Brower, pages 60-61). 
The Respondent Dr. Brown, prior to the operation, on 
or about Oct 14, 1980 advised Appellants that the pain she 
had been experiencing and the endometriosis would be gone as 
a result of the surgery, and that he "guaranteed" that 
Appellant Saundra Brower was going to feel better than she 
had in her whole life. (Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 
41-42.) Appellant Saundra Brower as of the date of the 
hysterectomy was thirty nine years old, having been born Dec. 
29, 1942. (Deposition of Saundra Brower page 5.) Said 
Appellant has described her problems as a result of the 
negligence complained of as a "living hell". (Deposition of 
Saundra Brower page 92.) 
Appellant Saundra Brower in July of 1981 was required 
to obtain emergency hospital and medical treatment from a Dr. 
Bever and a Dr. Pandya in Kanab, Utah, for problems connected 
to the negligence of the Respondents, to wit the hysterectomy 
and injury sustained to Appellant's right thigh, at which 
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time she discovered the negligence of Respondents. 
(Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 66-69,93-95.) In addition, 
Appellant was required to undergo additional female surgery 
in 1983 by Dr. Johnson to remove additional endometriosis. 
(Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 92,93.) 
As stated, Appellant, Saundra Brower discovered the 
negligence of Respondents in July of 1981 when she was forced 
to seek treatment from Dr. Pandya and go to the hospital in 
Kanab. She testified as follows: 
"...and they both told me at the time that if I 
wanted to go after him for malpractice, that they 
were behind me; that I had a suit against him." 
Deposition of Saundra Brower page 94 lines 6-8) 
Further, Dr. Pandya and Dr, Bever told the Appellant at 
that time that what had happened was as a result "...of the 
treatment I had been given by Dr. Brown and the injection I 
had received..." (Deposition of Saundra Brower page 94 lines 
2-4) 
Appellant Saundra Brower testified as follows on page 
95 of her deposition: 
"Dr. Bever, after checking me, called Dr. 
Pandya on the phone, and I was aware...and I could 
hear the conversation on Dr. Bever's part. And he 
said to Dr. Pandya what Dr. Brown did to me was 
criminal; that if he had gone out and killed 
someone or robbed a bank, he would go to jail for 
it, and what he did to me was far worse than what 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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any criminal in jail had done; that he had no right 
to have done it and get by with it." (Deposition of 
Saundra Brower page 95) 
Dr. Pandya further stated that Appellant's vagina was 
like raw hamburger because she did not have the hormone 
nourishment needed in that area, that Appellant should not 
have had to go through the hot flashes and there is no need 
for anyone to go through what Appellant did when there was 
treatment available, that Appellant had needed estrogen which 
was not prescribed by Respondent Dr. Brown, who was fifteen 
years behind in his treatment. (Deposition of Saundra 
Brower, page 96.) 
Appellant did not pursue the further treatment until 
July of 1981 when the hot flashes the tenderness became worse 
and she developed a blood clot in the area on her leg where 
the injection had been given in the hospital while she was 
under anesthetic. (Deposition of Saundra Brower, page 66 line 
24-25, page 67 line 1-2.) Appellant Saundra Brower testified 
that between the latter part of 1980 and July of 1981 that 
she had persistant aching pain, and that when the blood clot 
developed in June or July of 1981 that "...it really got 
bad." She further testified that Dr. Pandya told her he felt 
it was a combination of the injection and the fact that the 
endometriosis had not cleared up and had cut off circulation 
to the leg. (Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 67-68.) 
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The charge Nurse, Condra Lawrence, who attended to the 
Appellant Saundra Brower while in the hospital in 1980, 
testified that she did discuss the matter of the "puncture 
wound" with Respondent Dr. Brown who said, "That would be 
OK," (Deposition of Condra Lawrence, page 12, lines 24-25 and 
page 13, lines 1-2.) She testified that Respondent Dr. Brown 
said it was OK to apply a hot pack. (Deposition of Condra 
Lawrence, page 13, lines 9-11.) 
Appellant Saundra Brower testified that while in the 
hospital in October of 1980, she asked Dr. Brown, the 
Respondent, what happened to her leg. He replied, "I don't 
know, but I111 find out." Further, said Appellant said she 
"asked everybody", and one nurse said, "I'll find out." Dr. 
Brown, the Respondent, never did say anything about the leg 
to the Appellants again. (Deposition of Saundra Brower page 
51, lines 12-13, page 52, lines 1, 8-15, page 53, line 
16-21.) 
The Notice of Intent of the Appellants pursuant to Utah 
code Ann. sec 78-14-18 was duly served Feb. 16, 1983, and 
the complaint herein was duly filed June 14,1984. (See 
complaint of Appellants of June 14, 1984.) 
In the Affidavit of Saundra Brower, filed together with 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgement of the Appellant and 
dated Sep. 1 1984, Plaintiff stated therein she did not 
discover the negligence of the Respondents until July of 1981 
when she was required to go to the Kanab Hospital in Kanab 
Utah under the care of Dr. Pandya. (See Affidavit of Saundra 
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of Saundra Brower dated Sep 1, 1981.) 
The order denying Plainiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment as against both Respondents was entered Mar. 11, 
1985 and was certified for appeal pursuant to rule 54 (b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. The orders granting the 
motions of the Respondents were final. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The Appellants were not advised of the misconduct and/or 
negligence of the Respondents until July of 1981, when 
Appellant Saundra Brower sought emergency medical treatment 
for problems proximately flowing from such negligence, at 
which time a physician advised her of Respondents1 
misconduct. The exception of Foil v Ballinger, 601 P d 144 
(Utah 1979) applies. In Foil, the statute of limitations 
commenced to run when the Plaintiff was advised of the 
misconduct by a medical panel more than two years following 
the actual injury. Likewise, Appellants were so advised 
approximately 9 months thereafter, but filed their action 
within two years thereafter. 
POINT II 
Since genuine issues of fact exist as to the date when 
Appellants knew or should have known of the negligence of 
Respondents, the court, considering all the evidence, and 
giving all reasonable inferences to Appellants, should have 
denied Respondents Motions for Summary Judgment. 
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POINT III 
Appellants had no knowledge of Respondents1 negligence 
until July of 1981, which was within two years of the date of 
service of the notice of intent and filing suit. The 
negligent injection or puncture wound was done while 
Appellant Saundra Brower was under anesthetec. Respondents 
supressed any evidence of wrongdoing. Respondent Brown did 
not tell Appellants there was anything unusual about her 
problems following thesurgery. No evidence exists showing 
Appellants knew of Respondent's misconduct at the time of 
the injuries, other than that Appellant Saundra Brower1s leg 
hurt in the hospital. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DATE OF RUNNING OF THE TWO YEAR STATUTE COMMENCED 
RUNNING UPON DISCOVERY OF RESPONDENTS1 MISCONDUCT BY 
APPELLANTS IN JULY OF 1981, NOT IN OCTOBER OF 1980 
WHICH WAS THE DATE OF THE INJURY. 
Respondents have contended in their memorandums on file 
herein in support of their Motions for Summary Judgment that 
the Appellants discovered and were aware of the negligence of 
the Respondents in October of 1980, when the injury occurred 
at Respondents' Hospital and when the hysterectomy was 
performed and the advice given to the Appellant thereby by 
Respondent Brown. (See Memorandums of Points and Authorities 
in support of Respondents Motions for Summary Judgment dated 
Aug.3 and 10, 1985.) 
]0. 
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This case is similiar to the case of Foil v 
Ballinger, 601 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1979). The Plaintiff sustained 
a back injury, in May of 1967, being an industrial injury, 
and subsequently received a permanant subarachnoid phenol 
block on Jan. 18, 1974. The injuries complained of arose 
out of the "block". 
The Plaintiff in Foil continued to sustain further 
problems following the "block" relating to her bladder and 
her rectum, and underwent a total colectomy and 
ileoproctostomy in December of 1975. On Jun. 23, 1977, the 
Utah State Industrial Commission issued a written report 
indicating that both the rectal and bladder problems of the 
Plaintiff had been caused primarily by "the block" 
administered Jan 18, 1974. The court held that the two year 
statute began running as of the date the Plantiff was advised 
by the written report of the State Industrial Commission 
dated Jun. 23, 1977, not the date of the injury, which was in 
1974. The court further held that the cause of action of the 
Plaintiff was not barred therein. On Mar. 17, 1978, more 
than four years after the administration of the "block", a 
Notice of Intent was served for the first time on the 
Defendant in that action, and then on Jun.26, 1978, an action 
was filed against the Defendant. 
The instant case is comparable to Foil (supra), in that 
although Appellant Saundra Brower, sustained the injury in 
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October of 1980, she did not become aware until July of 1981 
that injuries were caused due to the negligence or conduct of 
the Respondents. This was at the time that Appellant Saundra 
Brower was compelled to receive emergency treatment at the 
Kanab Hospital in July of 1981, and from Dr. Pandya. 
(Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 66-69.) 
The Court in Foil (supra) a p. 148, cited Christianson v 
Reese, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P 2d 435 (1968) stating that if 
the patient was ignorant of "his right of action for 
malpractice," the cause of action accrued at the date "he" 
learned of the foreign object in his body. 
In Foil, the Court stated at page 147, (supra): 
"But when injuries are suffered that have 
been caused by an unknown act of negligence by an 
expert, the law ought not to be construed to 
destroy the right of action before a person even 
becomes aware of the existence of that right..." 
Further, on page 148, (id.) the court 
said: "This court held, overrulling a previous 
case, that if the patient was ignorant of "his" 
right of action for malpractice," the cause of 
action did not accrue at the date of the alleged 
negligence, but rather at the date he learned of 
the foreign object in his body..." 
The Court further continues and says at page 
148, (supra) "In the instant case the Plaintiff 
alleges she did not know of her right of action for 
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malpractice until she was apprised of the 
cause of her injuries by the medical panel report. 
We see no basis formaking a legal distinction 
between having no knowledge of an injury, as was 
the case in Christiansen, and no knowledge that a 
known injury was caused by unknown negligence. 
Accordingly, we hold that the term discovery of 
"injury" in Section 78-14-4 means discovery of 
injury and the negligence which results in the 
injury." 
Appellant had no way of knowing or discovering the 
negligence of the Respondents at the time the act ocurred. 
There was supression of communication of the knowledge of 
that negligence, not only by the charge nurse of the 
Respondent Hospital, but also by Dr. Brown. (Deposition of 
Saundra Brower pages 51,52). (Deposition of Condra Lawrence, 
pages 9,10; 12 line 24 to page 13 line 2) 
The acquisition of the knowledge of the misconduct of 
Respondents was precipated by the problems resulting from 
Respondents1 negligence requiring her to go to the emergency 
hospital in July of 1981 where she acquired such knowledge. 
(Deposition of Saundra Brower pages 66-67). 
When the Notice of Intent was filed herein, on Feb 16, 
1983, it was within two years of the date of discovery of the 
negligence of Respondents, as was the filing of Appellants1 
complaint in June, 1983. 
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Point II 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE RESPONDENTS1 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT WERE RAISED BY APPELLANT. 
It is well settled that if genuine issues of material 
fact are raised, a motion for summary judgment should be 
denied. (Am.Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions, sec. 470, and 61 
ALR 2d 341.) 
Under Utah code, Ann., (1953, as amended), sec 78-12-47, 
the issue of the Statute of Limitations, when demanded by a 
party, may be tried separately before any issues in the case 
are tried. The Respondent Dr. Brown filed a Motion for a 
separate trial of the statute of limitations issue, Jun. 1, 
1984, which is on file. Apellants' Motion for a Partial 
Summary Judgment on the issue of such a separate trial was 
denied by the District Court Mar.11, 1985. (Order Denying 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.) 
Respondents1 motions for summary judgment should have been 
denied out of hand because of the existence of genuine issues 
of material fact, as follows: 
A. Whether Appellants saw any apparent connection 
between the treatment provided by the health care providers 
(Respondents) and the injury suffered. 
B. Whether the Plaintiff knew or should have known of 
the misconduct of Respondents at the time of the injury 
(ies). 
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C. Whether the injury was catastrophic. 
D. Whether Appellants1 first knowledge of the 
misconduct of Respondents was in July of 1981. 
E. Whether Respondents suppressed evidence of their 
misconduct. 
F. What was the date of discovery of Respondents1 
misconduct? The record is devoid of any evidence 
conrtadicting Appellant's learning of the misconduct of 
Respondents in July of 1981. 
The Utah rule is clearly stated in Bushnell Real 
Estate, Inc. v Nielson, 672 P. 2d 746, 749 (Utah, 1983) 
This Court has often stated the standard of 
review for summary judgments. In reviewing a 
summary judgment, we must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment to determine whether 
there is a material issue of fact to be tried. The 
movant is entitled to summary judgment only if he 
is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" on 
the undisputed facts. Utah R.Civ P 56 (c). 
Horgan v Industrial Design Corp,, Utah, 657 
P2d 751, 752, (1982) (citations omitted). In a 
recent case, we emphasized that "(s)ummary judgment 
is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no 
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genuine issue of material fact and that the 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Lockhart Co. v Equitable Reality Co., Utah, 657 P 
2d 1333,1335 (1983) (Quoting Bowen v Riverton City, 
Utah, 656 P 2d 434 (1982)" 
This policy is reflected in Maughan v S.W. servicing, Inc. 
758 F. 2d 1381 (1985 ), reversing a Utah United States 
District Court decision. 
Point III. 
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT APPELLANTS 
KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN UNTIL JULY, 1981 THAT THE ACTUAL 
INJURIES APPELLANT SAUNDRA BROWER SUFFERED MAY HAVE BEEN 
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS. 
Foil (supra page 147) states that Foil sought to 
protect only "the untutored average layman [who sees] no 
apparent connection between the treatment provided by the 
physician and the injury suffered." (brackets ours). The 
following evidence indicates Appellants could not have 
become aware of any misconduct until July 1981: 
A. Appellant, Saundra Brower testified that Dr. Brown 
stated to her immediately prior to the surgery, on or about 
Oct 14, 1980: "He said it would clear up the endometriosis, 
and that the pain would be gone, and that he would guarantee 
that I was going to feel better than I had in my whole life." 
(Deposition of Saundra Brower, page 41, lines 11-14, page 42, 
lines 4-12) 
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B. Dr. Brown, approximately one month following the 
surgery in 1980, after checking Appellant Saundra Brower, 
told her that about all he could do was to give her one shot 
and some hormone cream. He told said Appellant that was all 
he could "really do for me." (Deposition of Saundra Brower 
page 61, line 9-20,25, page 62, line 1.) She was then advised 
by Dr. Brown that she could not take a hormone. (Deposition 
of Saundra Brower, page 66 lines 1-10.) 
C. As to the puncture or injection wound to the right 
thigh of Appellant Saundra Brower, while under anesthetic, 
she did inquire about it. She was told Dr. Brown was looking 
into it and that the nurse thought she had received a "K" 
shot. No further mention was made of it, and Appellant 
Brower thought, "That has happened, and figured, well, It's 
going to go away." Dr. Brown did not say anything about the 
leg to said Appellant again. (Deposition of Saundra Brower, 
pages 51-53, lines 14, 15, 20, 21)t 
It is obvious that Appellant did not have sufficient 
facts before her to suspect that her resulting injuries, 
which surfaced in an emergency situation almost a year later 
requiring her to go to the Kanab hospital, were caused by 
negligence, until she was so advised in July, of 1981. 
A Utah Bar journal article entitled "An Update on Utah's 
Medical Malpractice Discovery Rule" volume 12, Fall-Winter 
1984, page 63, discusses Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93, (Utah 
1982) and Hove v McMaster, 621 P 2d 694 (Utah, 1980). In 
both of those cases, the Court ruled or upheld the Defendant. 
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However, there is an important distinction in that in Reiser, 
the Plaintiff sustained a catastrophic injury during a 
routine treatment which resulted in cardiac arrest• That was 
not the case in the instant matter. The injuries sustained 
were not catastrophic, and were of a nature that, coupled 
with supression, would not have put the untutored layman on 
notice of anything except usual recovery symptoms. 
In Hove, the Plaintiff had consulted a neurologist 
within a year after the purported injury, who suggested 
that her complaint "might represent some complication of her 
prior dental injections and/or her dental surgery." (Hove v 
McMasters, supra, page 696.) 
Hove is distinguishable, because the Plaintiff waited 
more than two years from the date of the neurological 
analysis to file her complaint. That is not the case here. 
The Appellants filed their notice and complaint within the 
two years following the date of the analysis of their 
problems by another physician precipitated by Appellant 
Saundra Brower's going to another hospital in July of 1981 
where the negligence was discovered. 
In the instant case, there was (1) no obviousness of the 
connection between the treatment and the injury; (2) there 
was a distinct possibility that the injury might be mistaken 
as an unavoidable consequence of the medical treatment; (3) 
no medical diagnosis suggesting that the injury was caused by 
negligence was provided Appellants until July of 1981 when 
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Appellant Saundra Brower was forced to go to the hospital for 
complications flowing from the misconduct of Respondents. The 
notice of intent was filed well within two years from that 
date; (4) the patient had no subjective understanding of the 
field of medicine; (5) this was not a catastrophic type of 
injury; and (6) Appellant Saundra Brower relied on Respondent 
Brown's direct supervision over her and on his guarantees 
that she would have no further problems, and by reason of the 
fact that Respondent Dr. Brown, being advised of the injury 
to her leg, did not make any further comment or advice to her 
on it. Therefore she was misled, thinking it was merely a 
routine situation following her type of surgery and 
hospitilization. (See An Update on Utah's Medical Malpractice 
Discovery rule, supra p. 54) 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, It is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment and order granting the Motions for Summary Judgments 
of the Respondents be reversed; that the judgment denying 
Appellants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be reversed; 
and that Appellants, accordingly, should be allowed their day 
in court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON & WILKINSON 
by RUSSELL A. CANNON 
20. 
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William H. Wingo - #A3522 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
Valley View Medical Center 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IS 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DR. DAVID W. BROWN and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation, and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation doing business as 
VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 10205L 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant I.H.C. HOSPITA4S, 
INC., a corporation, and I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a corporation 
doing business as VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER (hereinafter referred 
to as "Hospital"), having come on for argument before the Honorably 
Allen B. Sorensen, the hospital being represented by Charles W. 
Dahlquist, II, Defendant Dr. David W. Brown being represented by 
Jody K. Burnett, and Plaintiffs being represented by Russell A. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Cannon, the Court having heard full argument on the matter and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted; Plaintifffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having 
been fully considered by and argued before the Court is hereby 
denied; and Plaintiffs1 action against Defendant Hospital is hereby] 
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this 5^, day of * ^ 3 ^ / 198 ^  -
BY THE COURT: 
QSSivw R vT<faw*-—• 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, District Judge Ret. 
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DAVID W. SLAGLE 
JODY K. BURNETT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant David W. Brown 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation, and I.H.C. 
HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation doing business Civil No. 10201 
as VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Dr. David W. 
Brown, having come on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, 
December 19, 1984, before the above-entitled Court, and Russell 
A. Cannon appearing for the plaintiff, Charles W. Dahlquist, II, 
appearing for defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. dba Valley View 
Medical Center, and Jody K. Burnett appearing for defendant 
Dr. David W. Brown; and the Court having reviewed the pleadings, 
memoranda, and depositions on file herein, and having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintifffs 
complaint as against Defendant Dr. David W. Brown be and the 
same is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, 
and judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant Brown and 
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
DATED this ^ day of V^Xfri> * , 1985. 
BY THE COMMIT: 
V^Ufe.^sHiA^ 
Allen B. Sorensen, Senior District 
Court Judge 
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CANNON & WILKINSON 
By: Russell A* Cannon 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8100 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
DR DAVID W, BROWN, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT DENYING PLAINTIFFS1 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 10200, 
The motions for partial summary judgment of plaintiffs as 
against each of the Defendants respectively, having come on 
regularly for hearing December 19, 1984, before the above entitled 
court, Russell A. Cannon appearing for Plaintiffs, Charles 
Dahlquist appearing for Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. dba 
Valley View Medical Center, and Jody K. Burnett appearing for 
Defendant Dr. David W. Brown; and the court having reviewed the 
pleadings and memoranda on file herein, and having heard the 
viii . 
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arguments of counsel, and the court being fully advised in the 
premises, good cause appearing therefore, and this court finding 
and determining there is no just cause for delay of the appeal, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as against Defendant Dr. 
David W. Brown, is denied; that Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a 
corporation, dba Valley View Medical Center, is hereby denied. 
There is no just cause for delay of this appeal as to both of 
said Orders and Judgments denying Plaintiffs' respective Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and it is hereby ordered that the 
same and each of them be entered as final judgments. Each 
party shall bear its own ccsts. 
Dated this ^ \ day of <7> ^/V~- , 1985 
BY THE COURT 
O ^ O "Nr 
V X TOVN V S ^ ^ V vwJ*: 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
District Judge, Retired 
-2-
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CANNON & WILKINSON 
By: Russell A. Cannon 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8100 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, ] 
et al., \ 
Defendants. 
) CIVIL NO. 10201 
1 ORDER PUBLISHING 
) DEPOSITIONS 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties in 
open court of the above entitled matter on December 19, 
1984, it is hereby ordered that all of the depositions in 
this matter, to wit: SAUNDRA BROWER, OSCAR F. BROWER, DR. 
DAVID W. BROWN, CONDRA LAWRENCE, DOYLE T. CANTRELL, 
VIRGINIA E. WYATT are hereby ordered published. 
DATED: January J P , 1985 
X. 
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RUSSELL A. CANNON 
Cannon & Wilkinson 
Attorneys at Law 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 355-8100 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, 
and 
I. H. C. HOSPITALS INC., 
a corporation, and 
I. H. C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
a corporation doing 
business as VALLEY VIEW 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants. 
AFFADAVIT OF 
SAUNDRA BROWER, Plaintiff 
Civil No. 10201 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON: ss 
The Plaintiff, SAUNDRA BROWER, who being first duly 
sworn deposes says: 
1. That she is the Plaintiff in this matter. 
2. That she did not discover that Dr. Brown had been 
negligent until July of 1981, when she was required to go 
-1-
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for emergency treatment and hospitalization for her right 
thigh and groin area to the Kanab Hospital in Kanab, Utah 
under the care of Dr. Pandya. That at that time she became 
aware that her problems resulted from the treatment and/or 
surgery of Dr. Brown. 
3. That she did not discover until July of 1981 as 
a result of the above referred to hospitalization, and 
treatment that the injury to her right thigh, sustained while 
under the exclusive care and control of Valley View Medical 
Center, while under an anesthetic, had resulted in a con-
tinuing injury to her. She did not discover until that time 
that the injury to 1 rr right thigh was due to the negligence 
of both defendants. 
4. The undersi yned was not told that the puncture 
injury to her right thigh was negligent or improper, or 
treated improperly, by any of the defendants or their 
representatives, nor was she told by Dr. Brown at any time 
that his treatment was improper or negligent. 
5. That she had no way of knowing that she sustained a 
legal injury or that there had been any negligence in connection 
with this operation or the injury sustained in the hospital, 
prior to July, 1981, when Dr. Bever and Dr. Pandya indicated 
otherwise, nor could she with reasonable diligence, based on 
-2-
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the circumstances, have discovered such negligence prior 
thereto. 
DATED: September 1 , 1984 at St. George, Utah. 
SAUNDRA BROWER 
Subscribed and Sworn to 
before me Notary Public. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
xiii 
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78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No mal-
practice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that 
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; 
and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within om year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under 
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; 
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years 
after the effective date of this act. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the pro-
spective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice 
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occur-
rence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the man-
ner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such 
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action 
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior 
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the mal-
practice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed 
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall 
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care 
provider. 
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